For years the majority of those individuals publicly indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remained at large due to a lack of co-operation from states whose assistance was required to effect their arrest. In order to assist in this regard, various operations have been undertaken since 1997 by which UN and regional missions have taken steps to assist the ICTY in the difficult task of bringing accused before the Tribunal in The Hague. Such steps were taken in the case of Stevan Todorovi´c, who was captured and transferred to The Hague by means of an operation shrouded in secrecy and alleged to have involved illegal behaviour on the part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force. The following article discusses the nature of Todorovi´c's arrest (based on the limited facts available) and his various attempts to have his indictment dismissed due to the nature of his arrest. In so doing, it considers the state of the law regarding the appropriateness of an international judicial body proceeding with the trial of an individual brought before it by potentially illegal means. Although a plea agreement was reached in the case, with the result that the judicial consideration of the issues is limited, important issues are nevertheless raised in the arguments of the Office of the Prosecution and the defence counsel which are likely to recur in similar cases in the future.
INTRODUCTION
Stevan Todorovi´c, a Bosnian Serb, was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 1 on 21 July 1995 for crimes against Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and other non-Serbs. He was alleged to have committed these crimes between 1991 and 1993 while he was chief of police in the Bosanski Samac municipality of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 He was charged with crimes against humanity, grave breaches, and war crimes arising from acts of rape, murder, torture, sexual humiliation, and other cruelty. 3 On 27 September 1998, after remaining at large for almost three years, he was captured and transferred to the Tribunal under circumstances which are -and are likely forever to remain -unclear. It was the circumstances of his capture, coupled with an overriding desire on the part of the ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to keep them secret, that ultimately led to 26 of the 27 counts against Todorovi´c being dropped. According to Todorovi´c's version of events, as well as various media reports, on the night of 27 September 1998, four armed, masked men burst into Todorovi´c's home in Zlatibor in western Serbia, gagged, blindfolded, and beat him with a baseball bat, 4 then proceeded to smuggle him out of the country and into Bosnia and Herzegovina. 5 Within a few minutes of Todorovi´c's arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a helicopter arrived to take him to the base of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) 6 at Tusla.
7
Depending on which newspaper accounts (if any) are believed, those involved in his capture were either 'bounty hunters' 8 paid from a 'CIA slush fund', 9 or members of the British SAS and/or elite Delta units from the United States. 10 According to one account, his captors had offered to let him go in return for the equivalent of £13,000.
11
While some of these reports seem far-fetched and elements may be unfounded, because of the wall of secrecy erected by SFOR and strenuously defended by the OTP, untested allegations and unconfirmed press reports are all we have to inform us of what actually happened on the night of 27 September 1998.
In a complicated series of motions, Todorovi´c set out to show that his capture was illegal and raised the issue of the involvement of the OTP and SFOR. In order to prove this assertion, Todorovi´c repeatedly asked for co-operation from SFOR in the form of the provision of documents and testimony relating to the circumstances of the arrest. This co-operation was not forthcoming. Ultimately, when it became clear that the Trial Chamber was going to require disclosure from SFOR -despite the determined efforts of the OTP and SFOR to prevent this -a deal was reached and a Plea Agreement was entered into between the OTP and Todorovi´c. According to the terms of the Plea Agreement, the OTP would drop all counts but one against Todorovi´c and, in return, Todorovi´c would no longer insist on accessing the SFOR documents and agree to non-Serb civilians', torture, forcing detainees to sign false confessions and ordering deportations and forcible transfers. Ibid., at para. 9. 4. At his initial appearance before the ICTY on 30 Sept. 1998 he advised the Trial Chamber that he 'did not feel well because he had received a heavy blow with a baseball bat over his head "during the kidnapping"'. See Prosecution Response to the Appeal Brief of the Accused/Appellant Stevan Todorovi´c, filed 4 Aug. 1999, at para. 9, n. 8. Ibid., at para. 11. 8. See Castle, supra note 5. See also S. Davids, 'NATO "Gang" Jailed Over Todorovi´c', Birmingham Post, 12 Dec.
2000, 9, where it is reported that 'Nine Serbs who were allegedly paid £15,500 by NATO to capture and smuggle [Todorovi´c] into Bosnia, were yesterday jailed for kidnapping.' 9. See J. Swain, 'Serb Snatched by Rogue Bounty Hunter', Sunday Times, 23 July 2000, 25. 10. See Walker, supra note 5. 11. See Swain, supra note 9.
co-operate with the OTP in relation to the provision of information and evidence regarding the events in the former Yugoslavia. 12 As envisaged by the Plea Agreement, 13 Todorovi´c was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for the single count to which he pleaded guilty. Despite the protests of OTP officials that 'Absolutely nothing has been sacrificed', 14 in view of the gravity and extent of his crimes, it is fair to say that Todorovi´c got off relatively lightly.
This article considers the nature of Todorovi´c's various motions relating to illegal capture and the legal arguments advanced therein. In doing so, two other matters where similar arguments have been raised before the ICTY -that of Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovi´c 15 and Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli´c 16 -are touched upon. Finally, the discussion will consider the effects, if any, which the ICTY jurisprudence is likely to have on the functioning of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
DOKMANOVI´C: PRE-TODOROVIĆ
Slavko Dokmanovi´c was the first accused before the ICTY to make a claim of illegal capture.
17 Dokmanovi´c had been charged with grave breaches and violations of the laws and customs of war, and crimes against humanity in a confidential indictment dated 3 April 1996. On 27 June 1997 Dokmanovi´c was arrested after being lured from the town of Sombor, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 18 into UNadministered Croatia. The luring was a result of a combined operation by the OTP and the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTEAS).
19 Dokmanovi´c contended that the method of his arrest was tantamount to kidnapping and violated 'the Statute and Rules of the Tribunal, the sovereignty of the FRY, and international law'. 20 He further claimed that his right not to be deprived of his liberty and security of person except in accordance with legal procedures had been violated. 21 While the OTP freely conceded that it had used 'trickery', 22 it maintained that its actions were perfectly legal.
12. See Sentencing Judgment, supra note 3, at para. 5 et seq. 13. According to the terms of the Plea Agreement, both sides agreed that the OTP would recommend to a Trial Chamber a sentence of not less than five years' and not more than twelve years' imprisonment and that neither party would appeal. Ibid., at para. 11. 14. See J. The Trial Chamber agreed, finding that the trickery used by the OTP did not amount to 'a forcible abduction or kidnapping'. 23 Although Dokmanovi´c had been 'deceived, tricked, and lured into going into Eastern Slavonia', the conduct was 'consistent with the principles of international law and the sovereignty of the FRY'.
24
Because of its determination that the capture was legal, the Trial Chamber did not have to 'decide . . . whether the International Tribunal has the authority to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant illegally obtained from abroad'. 25 This issue was to present itself less than a year later in the Todorovi´c case.
THE TODOROVI´C CASE

An overview of the legal process
Upon being presented to the ICTY in The Hague on 30 September 1998, Todorovi´c entered a plea of not guilty to all 27 counts against him, and began a long process of filing motions for his release. The motions filed by Todorovi´c were legion, and only those directly related to the illegal capture will be discussed here. 26 Referring to the series of motions that will be discussed below, the OTP noted that Regardless of the various characterizations given by the Accused to [his] numerous Motions, they all essentially amount to an assertion that the manner in which he was apprehended entitles him to the ultimate remedy of release from the Tribunal's custody and his repatriation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
27
Todorovi´c's motions relating to illegal capture came in four waves: 1 a motion requesting an evidentiary hearing and disclosure from the OTP; 2 motions requesting judicial assistance to compel the production of information from the FRY and SFOR; 3 motions requesting his release; and 4 asecond volley of motions requesting judicial assistance to compel production of information from the FRY, SFOR and the United States. requested: the right to give evidence in the matter; a discovery order directed to the OTPtomake available all documents in its possession relating to his detention, arrest, and delivery to the Tribunal; his return to the FRY; and dismissal of his indictment. 28 He alleged that he was 'illegally kidnapped by four unknown individuals in the FRY' 29 and argued that this raised 'the issue of the Prosecution's involvement in an illegal abduction . . .'. 30 He argued further that even if the OTP was not involved, the method of capture still went to the legality of his being brought before the Tribunal. The Trial Chamber orally rejected the motion on 4 March 1999 and, on 25 March 1999, issued a short written decision 31 reaffirming its oral rejection of the Motion and ruling that 'the Motion does not contain sufficient factual and legal material . . . to warrant an evidentiary hearing'. 32 An appeal was denied, 33 with the Appeals Chamber finding in a 13 October 1999 Decision that it had no basis to intervene as there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial Chamber. 
Motions to compel disclosure from the FRY and SFOR
On 21 and 22 September 1999, while the above-discussed motion was still under appeal, Todorovi´c brought motions seeking orders from the Trial Chamber for the production of documents and witnesses by the Ministry of the Interior of the FRY and by SFOR. 35 He claimed that these materials would be necessary for the evidentiary hearing that would result if he was successful in his then pending appeal. 36 On 21 October 1999, in view of the fact that Todorovi´c's appeal was not successful (and no evidentiary hearing was ordered to take place), the Trial Chamber dismissed the motions. 
Motions for release
When it became clear that an evidentiary hearing was not to be ordered by the Appeals Chamber (and that the Trial Chamber was not going to compel SFOR and the FRY to provide documentation and witnesses in support of such a hearing), 28 38 Here again he based his request for relief on an assertion that his arrest was illegal, arguing that it was in violation of state sovereignty and contrary to customary international law.
39 He attached to this motion a statement setting out his allegations regarding the events surrounding his arrest and delivery to the ICTY. 40 Shortly thereafter, on 15 November 1999, Todorovi´c filed a habeas corpus motion, yet again basing his claim on allegations of illegal capture. 41 The Trial Chamber issued an oral Decision on 23 November 1999 in which it found that Todorovi´c's statement 'was a new circumstance such that it justified ordering an evidentiary hearing on the legality of the arrest and detention of the Accused'. 
Motions to compel disclosure from SFOR, the United States, and the FRY
On 24 November 1999, the day after the Trial Chamber ordered an evidentiary hearing, Todorovi´c brought a further motion seeking an order that SFOR provide him with documents and witnesses 'relating to [his] abduction, kidnapping and detention'. 43 In the words of the Trial Chamber, the purpose of the motion was 'to secure certain information and documents, which the accused believes to be in the custody and control of SFOR, and which will assist him in his motions challenging the legality of his arrest'. 44 Todorovi´c also sought similar documentation from the OTP. 45 On 7 March 2000 the Trial Chamber ordered the OTP to provide Todorovi´c with all relevant reports and material in its possession, including the identity of the individuals involved in Todorovi´c's arrest, as well as to inform him of the steps it had taken to obtain relevant information from SFOR. 46 (persecution as a crime against humanity) among the 27 against him and he would agree to withdraw all motions pending before the Trial Chamber relating to the evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of his arrest and his request for judicial assistance. Specifically, he would withdraw the allegations that his arrest was unlawful and that SFOR or NATO was involved in any unlawful activity in relation to his arrest.
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On 29 November 2000 the OTP and counsel for Todorovi´c filed a joint motion disclosing the terms of the Plea Agreement to the Trial Chamber. 66 On 13 December 2000 Todorovi´c entered a plea of guilty to the single count 67 and, on 31 July 2001, the Trial Chamber sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment less the nearly three years he had spent in custody awaiting the outcome of his case. 68 No appeal was filed against the Sentencing Judgment, and on 12 December 2001 Todorovi´c was transferred to Spain to serve his sentence. 
The legal arguments
It is clear from Todorovi´c's various motions that his goal was to rely on the nature of his capture and the sensitivities of SFOR, NATO, and the OTP to disclosure of any information relating thereto, in order to obtain his release and the withdrawal of the charges against him. The OTP, for its part, had two goals in the case which were, at times, incompatible. First, it wanted to prevent Todorovi´c from gaining access to SFOR documents in order to ensure the continued co-operation of that organization. Second, it wanted to ensure that justice would be done and that Todorovi´c -and potentially other accused captured in similar circumstances -would be unable to rely on his method of capture as a means to gain his release. The ultimate result in the case (26 out of 27 of the charges against Todorovi´c being dismissed in return for his renouncing his right to access SFOR information) appears to be a vindication of Todorovi´c's strategy and may be an indication that the OTP's desire to ensure that SFOR did not have to disclose any information relating to the capture of Todorovi´c was its primary concern, surpassing all else, including its desire to ensure the accused did not escape justice.
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The focus of the arguments that emerged in response to Todorovi´c's motions 71 varied somewhat depending on whether they were being advanced by SFOR or the 65. Http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index. htm. 66. See Sentencing Judgment, supra note 3, at para. 4. 67. Ibid., at para. 5. 68. Ibid., at para. 117. 69. See supra note 65. 70. The OTP's concern with preserving the secrecy of SFOR was so great that it formally requested the Trial Chamber for prior notice of any decision it might make compelling SFOR to provide documents so that the OTP could decide whether to withdraw the indictment altogether. OTP. In short, the arguments of the OTP and/or SFOR were as follows: 72 1 that the Tribunal lacked the authority to order the disclosure from SFOR; 2 that there was no prima facie basis for the Trial Chamber to order a judicial inquiry;
3 that concerns regarding SFOR's operational security should prevent the Trial Chamber from making the requested order;
4 that, even assuming that the facts were as alleged by Todorovi´c, there should be no disclosure ordered from SFOR because the facts did not entitle Todorovi´c to the remedy sought; and 5 that there was no unlawful breach of the FRY's sovereignty.
Lack of authority on the part of the ICTY to order disclosure from SFOR
The argument that the Trial Chamber lacked the power to order disclosure occupied the bulk of the Trial Chamber's attention. 73 This argument was primarily advanced by SFOR. 74 The Trial Chamber took it as read that it had the power to issue binding orders on states, 75 but examined the question of whether it had a similar power against SFOR. In addressing this, the Trial Chamber considered the establishment of SFOR, its relationship with the ICTY, 76 the scope of Article 29 of the Statute of the ICTY, 77 and the jurisprudence of the ICTY on similar issues, and concluded that it was 'competent to issue a binding order under Article 29 of the Statute to the 33 participating States of SFOR, and through its responsible authority, the North Atlantic Council, to SFOR itself'. 78 Judge Robinson, in his Separate, Concurring 72. There was considerable overlap between the arguments of the OTP and SFOR. With the exception of arguments 1 and 3, the arguments are primarily considered herein in the manner they were advanced by the OTP. 73. See Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at paras. 38-58. The argument occupied at least three-quarters of the Trial Chamber's legal reasoning. 74. Initially the OTP also advanced the argument, but it later capitulated on the point. The OTP had originally 'contended that the power to order SFOR to produce documents was not a power that the Trial Chamber had . . . '. Later, however, it stated that 'although there were potential circumstances under which it would be appropriate for the Trial Chamber to make such an order, it was not appropriate in this particular situation'.
Ibid., at para. 31. 75. In support of this finding the Trial Chamber relied on Article 29 of the Statute of the ICTY (which obliges states to co-operate with the ICTY in its investigation and prosecution, including an obligation to arrest and surrender ICTY indictees), Rule 54bis of the Rules of Evidence (which provides for orders for the production of documents to be directed to states) and its previous jurisprudence (Prosecutor v. In the light of the fact that the OTP had been making the identical argument since Todorovi´c's first motion was filed in February 1999, 82 it appeared unlikely to win the day. In fact, the argument appeared to do little but antagonize the Trial Chamber, which noted:
The Prosecution sought to argue once more that there is no basis in the evidence to date which entitled Todorovi´c to obtain such material. As the Trial Chamber, in its Order of 7 March 2000, has already held that there is such a basis, and as the application by the Prosecution for leave to appeal against that decision was refused, it is not open to the Prosecution to re-agitate that issue now. 
Arguments relating to SFOR's operational security
Arguments that to provide the requested disclosure would jeopardize SFOR's operational security were primarily, though not exclusively, 84 to these concerns, Todorovi´c had signalled a willingness 'to reach an acceptable resolution that would address both the Defence need for information and SFOR's concern to protect its security and operational methods'. 85 Such an approach, which would have seen SFOR engaging with counsel for the accused in a discussion of mutual concerns relating to the information, was rejected by SFOR -to its ultimate disadvantage. In dismissing SFOR's objections relating to national security, the Trial Chamber noted that 'It was open to SFOR to make specific objections to the disclosure of particular documents or other material at the hearing . . . but SFOR chose not to do so.' 86
Arguments that the motion should be dismissed because Todorovi´c was not entitled to
the relief he sought From the start, 87 the main strategy of the OTP -a strategy later adopted by SFORwas to attempt to convince the Trial Chamber that there was no need for Todorovi´c to have details of the circumstances surrounding his arrest in order to conduct his defence. This was so, the OTP argued, because it was willing to 'proceed to a determination of the merits of this action on the basis of the current record viewed in the light most favourable to the Defence'. 88 As such, it argued, there were no facts in dispute, merely the legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom dealing with what an appropriate remedy might be. As to the question of remedy, the OTP asserted that, because Todorovi´c's allegations were not sufficiently grave, the requested remedy -dismissal of the indictment and immediate release -was unavailable to him. To make such an order would have been an abuse of the Trial Chamber's discretion 89 and have the added disadvantage of alienating SFOR (which had shown itself to be a staunch ally of the Tribunal). It would appear that the OTP framed the issues in this way as part of a strategy of refocusing the issues away from the question of whether Todorovi´c had a right to access SFOR documents, instead directing the attention of the nature of its security concerns. The OTP later modified its approach somewhat, arguing that an order for disclosure would jeopardize the voluntary co-operation of states and organs such as SFOR: 'Any requirement by the Tribunal that such states and entities disclose such details to the Tribunal may lead to a withdrawal of their willingness to provide such voluntary assistance. This would be contrary to the interests of the Tribunal and would seriously jeopardize its ability to fulfil its mandate. ' the Trial Chamber to the question of the appropriateness of Todorovi´c's requested remedy.
For the OTP's argument to have succeeded, the Trial Chamber would have had to accept both of its aspects: (a) that Todorovi´c's allegations had been accepted by the OTP and therefore his having access to SFOR documentation to advance his defence was no longer necessary; and (b) that on the 'agreed' facts, Todorovi´c's claim to release and dismissal of the charges against him was not sustainable. As we shall see, the Trial Chamber was not convinced by the first argument; as such, it did not consider the second.
This first aspect of the OTP's argument appears to be fundamentally flawed: it asks the Trial Chamber to find disclosure unnecessary because the ultimate remedy is not available on the facts -but the very purpose of the disclosure is to reveal to Todorovi´c what the facts are. 90 The only way in which the argument could be convincing would be if the OTP could satisfy the Trial Chamber that the disclosure could not under any circumstances lead to the requested remedy. While the OTP was willing to make such an extraordinary assertion 91 (something which is particularly surprising coming from a body which had earlier represented that the extent of the material it possessed on the circumstances of the arrest was a one-page report 92 ), the Trial Chamber appeared to disregard it. The Trial Chamber rejected the argument with the following statement:
This argument proceeds on the assumption that the evidence is complete. That assumption is erroneous, as what Todorovi´c is seeking is further evidence from SFOR which will assist him to obtain the relief which he seeks. Only when Todorovi´c has had the opportunity to present all the available evidence will it be possible for the Trial Chamber to determine whether he is entitled to the relief he seeks.
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Despite representations by the OTP and SFOR that the facts were not in dispute for the purposes of the motions, 94 it appears to have been obvious to the Trial Chamber that they were -if for no other reason than that all of the facts were not yet available to all of the parties. Even if Todorovi´c's allegations were accepted 'at their highest' by the OTP and SFOR for the purposes of the motions -something which was by no means clear 95 95. The OTP's assertion that it was willing to assume Todorovi´c's allegations to be true, and to take them 'at their highest' was quite misleading. Instead of taking his allegations at their highest, the OTP referred to a carefully drawn list of facts that it was willing to admit for the purposes of the motions and made no concessions additional to these (see supra note 88). Important omissions from the OTP's list included the allegations without having the requested disclosure. Without the full story of what happened surrounding his arrest (information presumably possessed by SFOR and its contributing states, and, perhaps, the OTP), Todorovi´c was disadvantaged; he was only in a position to make allegations relating to conduct of which he had first-hand knowledge. There was nothing to say that disclosure of the full story of his arrest would not show treatment that was significantly worse than he had alleged. 96 As such, the Trial Chamber correctly observed that it would only be appropriate to turn to the issue of the suitability of the remedy where the evidence was complete.
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Despite the finding of the Trial Chamber that the evidence was not complete and despite its decision not to go on to examine the suitability of the remedies requested by Todorovi´c, the arguments by the OTP and SFOR 98 in this regard warrant analysis.
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In short, the OTP argued that Todorovi´c's request that his indictment be dismissed and he be released stemmed from a misunderstanding of the law. Such a remedy was only available in the most egregious situations and the conduct he alleged was not sufficiently egregious. 100 Using the hypothetical example of an accused in a national legal system who was charged with murder and had been illegally beaten by police during arrest, the OTP argued that international norms do not necessarily require that the prosecution be terminated in the face of illegal behaviour. Other remedies may be appropriate and 97. This was particularly so given that at the core of the OTP's argument on the issue of the availability of the remedy was the assertion that the treatment of Todorovi´c was not sufficiently egregious to justify the requested relief; see notes 100-02 and accompanying text, infra. 98. Because the bulk of the arguments on the issues relating to remedy come from the OTP, this analysis follows its approach more closely than that of SFOR. Nevertheless, many aspects of the arguments of the OTP and SFOR are identical. Similar arguments were also raised by the United States, in its requests for a review of the 18 Oct. 2000 Decision; see notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text, supra. 99. In part due to the fact that in the Nikoli´c case (see supra note 16) the OTP has raised them once again in response to an accused's argument of illegal capture; see notes 172-85 and accompanying text, infra. 100. See Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 27, where the OTP observed: 'The accused's Motion appears to proceed from the assumption that if there is any breach of the fundamental rights of an accused in the criminal justice process, the accused will be entitled to have the indictment dismissed and to be released. This is clearly not the case. In many cases, where there is a violation of the rights of an accused, other remedies may be available to cure any resulting injustice.' justice system. In each case it is therefore necessary to identify exactly which rights of the accused are said to have been violated.
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To the OTP the 'question, then, is whether such illegalities in the accused's forcible removal from the FRY would require that the indictment against the accused be dismissed, and that the accused be released from custody'.
102
In order to answer its question, the OTP directed the Trial Chamber to the jurisprudence of various national courts in cases of illegal interstate capture -that is, cases where an accused was brought before a court in state A after having been captured in state B by the authorities of state A in a manner that was in violation of state B's laws and its sovereignty in international law.
Approaches to exercising jurisdiction over a defendant brought before a national court by illegal inter-state capture. As is well known, two approaches exist in national jurisprudence on the question of whether illegal capture in one state affects the ability of the other state properly to exercise its jurisdiction over an accused.
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According to one school of thought, it is perfectly proper for a national court to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who has been illegally captured from another state in violation of the sovereignty of that other state. In support of this approach the OTP relied primarily on the cases of Eichmann 104 and AlvarezMachain. 105 In
the words of the Israeli Supreme Court in Eichmann,
It is an established rule of law that a person standing trial for an offence against the laws of the land may not oppose his being tried by reason of the illegality of his arrest or of the means whereby he was brought to the area of jurisdiction of the country.
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This approach may be summarized in the Latin maxim male captus bene detentus (that is, a person improperly seized may nevertheless be properly detained), the international precedent for which is said to go back to the Eichmann case. 107 After the abduction of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann from Argentina, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution finding Argentina's sovereignty to have been 101. Ibid., at para. 28 (emphasis in original). An argument that in order to determine the suitability of the accused's proposed remedy the potential fairness of the trial must be considered 'in all the circumstances' with a careful examination of 'exactly which rights of the accused are said to have been violated', is not easily reconciled with the OTP's earlier argument that disclosure from SFOR on the facts surrounding Todorovi´c's arrest was unnecessary, as the matter could be decided on the limited facts available. 110 Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, was abducted from Mexico by US officials and taken forcibly to the United States to stand trial for kidnapping and murder. His abduction took place without the permission of the Mexican government and without regard to an existing extradition treaty. A majority of the US Supreme Court held that his abduction did not prohibit his trial in the United States and confirmed the existing rule that 'the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a "forcible abduction"'. 111 While conceding that the abduction 'may be in violation of general international law principles', 112 the majority of the Supreme Court held that it was not in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. 113 The decision generated criticism in the United States, condemnation by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and widespread outrage in the international community.
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The other approach to illegal inter-state capture in national jurisprudence takes the opposite view: if an individual is brought before a court by means of an illegal arrest, it is appropriate for that court to make a determination as to whether it should refuse to exercise jurisdiction. 115 The reasoning of this approach is well represented by the British case of Bennett, 116 which involved a citizen of New Zealand who was alleged to have committed criminal offences in the United Kingdom. He had been traced to South Africa, a country to which the UK Extradition Act (1989) applied, providing a process to bring him before British courts. This process was not followed; rather he was abducted from South Africa -the result, he claimed, of collusion between the South African and British police -and brought to England for trial. The case considered the two approaches to illegal inter-state capture in the context of both the British law and the law of other states, 117 and rejected the male captus bene detentus approach. A majority of the House of Lords found that courts had the power to refuse to try a case 'upon the grounds that it would be an abuse of process to do so'. 118 It concluded that courts possess the 'power to inquire into the circumstances by which a person has been brought within the jurisdiction and if satisfied that it was in disregard of extradition procedures it may stay the prosecution and order the release of the accused'. 119 Were the court to have found otherwise, it would have allowed the executive authority to take advantage of its illegal activity.
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In its pleadings, the OTP led by arguing in favour of the male captus bene detentus principle. It noted that the practice of exercising criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who had been forcibly abducted from another state in violation of that state's sovereignty had some support in national jurisprudence. 121 Moreover, it noted that 'Doctrinal support can also be found for the view that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in such circumstances is not in itself contrary to international law'. 122 However, despite this ostensible confidence in the male captus bene detentus principle in international law, the OTP carefully avoided going down a path that would have required it to champion the principle.
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Instead it rapidly moved to safer ground. Without conceding that a male captus bene detentus approach was untenable before the ICTY, 124 the OTP advised the Trial 116. Bennett, ibid. 117. In particular, the court relied on Ebrahim and Hartley (supra note 115) in reaching its decision. 118. Bennett, supra note 115, at 62 (AC). 119. Ibid., at 64 (AC). Although this case involved the circumvention of an extradition procedure, nothing in the reasoning of the House of Lords would indicate that a court's power to stay the prosecution in the face of an abuse of process was limited to such circumstances. The court expresses no opinion on cases not involving situations where extradition is unavailable. For more on the question of whether an extradition procedure is essential to the reasoning of the court, see notes 128-36 and accompanying text, infra. 120. Lord Griffiths stressed that while the courts 'of course, have no power to apply direct discipline to the police or the prosecuting authorities, . . . they can refuse to allow them to take advantage of abuse of power by regarding their behaviour as an abuse of process and thus preventing a prosecution'. Bennett, supra note 115, at 62 (AC Chamber that it would not be relying on the principle as it did not need to do so. 125 It argued that the requested remedy would be equally inappropriate whether the Trial Chamber accepted the male captus bene detentus approach or rejected it in favour of the approach of national courts which have held 'that a court should decline to exercise criminal jurisdiction over an accused who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by means of an irregular rendition'. 126 This was so, it argued, because 'the basis of the reasoning in these [latter] cases affords no valid analogy to the situation under consideration by this Trial Chamber in the present case'. 127 The OTP offered three reasons for this assertion: 1 in Todorovi´c's case there was no violation of an extradition treaty; 2 Todorovi´c's illegal capture was not undertaken by agents of the prosecuting state or organization; and 3 there was no violation of Todorovi´c's right to liberty and security of person.
Each reason will be briefly considered below.
Absence of an extradition treaty. It was argued by the OTP that some of the national court decisions refusing jurisdiction 'were premised on the fact that the removal of the accused from the other State involved a circumvention of applicable extradition procedures'.
128 It then noted the absence of extradition procedures in the Todorovi´c case. Without explicitly having said so, the implication of the OTP appeared to be that the existence of an extradition arrangement -and its circumvention -was somehow essential to the decisions of the national courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction; as there was no circumvention of any such agreement with Todorovi´c, the authorities did not apply.
This argument is misleading. It is uncontroversial that 'the transfer of an accused to the Tribunal by a State authority is not a matter of extradition'. 129 It is equally true to point out, as the OTP did, that 'the transfer of the accused to the Tribunal therefore cannot have constituted a breach of any rights under any extradition arrangement'. 130 However, while the reasoning in several of the cases cited was indeed based on the national court's concern at the state's ignoring an established extradition regime (thereby depriving the accused of guarantees afforded by that system), 131 none of the courts held -or implied -that the existence of an extradition treaty was a sine qua non of the determination to refuse jurisdiction. 132 The argument that national courts' reasoning -reflecting as it does a desire to protect the accused from illegal behaviour on the part of state agents, 133 to prevent the abuse of the process of the court, 134 to safeguard the rule of law, 135 and to protect an accused's freedom in society 136 -was contingent on the existence of an extradition regime was not convincingly made by the OTP.
Illegal capture not undertaken by agents of the Tribunal because SFOR, and not the OTP, stands in the position of the state agents who performed the illegal capture. The OTP stressed that the national cases where there was a refusal to exercise jurisdiction 'were premised on the fact that the authorities of the forum State [that is, the prosecuting state] were involved in the relevant illegality'. 137 The OTP argued that this reasoning was inapplicable to the Todorovi´c case because the OTP 'had no involvement in any activity relating to the accused's removal from the FRY', 138 it had not acted illegally, and the conduct of SFOR -legal or otherwise -could not be imputed to it. 139 While it is indeed true that the participation of agents of the prosecuting state 140 has been an important factor in the reasoning of national courts, 141 and while it is also true that different considerations may apply when the illegal arrest is carried out by individuals or authorities other than those representing the prosecuting state, this would only be relevant if the absence of ICTY involvement were beyond doubt.
131. See, for example, Bennett, supra note 115, at 62 (AC), where Lord Griffiths stressed the importance of the state not 'flouting the extradition procedures and depriving the accused of the safeguards built into the extradition process for his benefit'. 132. Indeed, in the Bennett case (ibid.), Lord Griffiths made it clear that he was unwilling to express any opinion on a scenario where there was no extradition procedure available. 133. See supra note 120. 134. See Hartley, supra note 115, at 215-17; cited with approval by Lord Griffiths in Bennett (supra note 115, at 60 (AC)). 135. See Hartley, ibid., at 217, where the court held:
We are . . . satisfied that the means which were adopted to make that trial possible are so much at variance with the statute, and so much in conflict with one of the most important principles of the rule of law, that if application had been made . . . , the judge would probably have been justified in exercising his discretion under [the statute] or under the inherent jurisdiction to direct that the accused be discharged.
Relied on by Lord Griffiths in Bennett, supra at note 115, at 55 (AC). 136. 'The issues raised by this affair are basic to the whole concept of freedom in society' (see Hartley, ibid.); cited with approval by Lord Griffiths in Bennett (ibid., at 54 (AC)). , where it was held that the exceptional remedy of dismissal and release was only appropriate where the misconduct was attributable to the conduct of the OTP. Since here it was not, they argued, the remedy was unavailable and an order for disclosure from SFOR would be unnecessary; see Prosecution Appeal and Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 26, at para. 14. 140. That is to say, enforcement officials from the same state where the case is being heard. 141. The OTP rightly noted that one of the purposes of courts having the discretion to refuse to exercise jurisdiction when the authorities of that same state had acted illegally 'is to impose a form of discipline and control over the authorities of the forum State' (see Prosecution Response of 22 Feb. 1999, supra note 70, at para. 37). See also note 120 and accompanying text, supra.
Here, however -even assuming that Todorovi´c's allegations of collusion between the OTP and SFOR would have been proved to be unfounded upon full disclosure of the facts 142 -the divide between SFOR and the Tribunal does not appear to be as great as the OTP and SFOR have represented it to be.
The OTP and SFOR placed great emphasis on their assertion that the OTP aloneand not SFOR -was by analogy to represent the enforcement agents of the prosecuting state in the national cases, with SFOR being treated as analogous to a third party. 143 However, the nature of the relationship between SFOR and the OTP and, more generally, between SFOR and the Tribunal as a whole, calls such an assertion into question. If one is to analogize the circumstances of Todorovi´c's capture with the law of interstate capture, it would surely be more apt to liken SFOR to the role of the enforcement agents of the prosecuting state. 144 They have, after all, been charged with effecting arrests on behalf of the Tribunal. 145 Such an approach is reflected in Judge Robinson's separate decision on the Motion for Judicial Assistance from SFOR and others, where he likens the role of SFOR 'to that of a police force in some domestic legal systems', and notes that 'it virtually operates as an enforcement arm of the Tribunal . . . '.
146 At a minimum, it would appear to be fitting to consider SFOR to be a co-enforcement official, alongside the OTP, given that each has a role in the execution of arrest warrants.
147 A similar argument made by counsel for Todorovi´c was that SFOR was acting as an agent of the Tribunal, because it ratified SFOR's conduct in obtaining custody of Todorovi´c by proceeding with the case. 148 Of course if SFOR were taken to be part of the ICTY's enforcement apparatus or an agent of the OTP, then the OTP's argument fails and the national jurisprudence whereby courts 142. Todorovi´c had made repeated claims that the OTP was involved in his capture (see, e.g., Decision on Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, supra note 28, at 2, and Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance of 18 Oct. 2000, supra note 6, at para. 33). However, the OTP's approach was to play down these allegations, at times denying that they existed and, at times, conceding they did exist but denying their veracity. If, as the OTP claimed, it had accepted Todorovi´c's allegations 'at their highest' (see note 95 and accompanying text, supra), it is indeed strange that it felt entitled to leave out his allegations against it in this regard. refuse jurisdiction to discourage authorities of the prosecuting state from behaving illegally becomes applicable.
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No violation of the accused's right to liberty and security of person. A third rationale, according to the OTP, for the refusal of jurisdiction over an accused whose presence was secured by illegal interstate capture was a concern about the accused's right to liberty and security of person. 150 This right is guaranteed by Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 151 The OTP argued that this rationale was inapplicable in this case, and gave various reasons for its assertion.
First, the OTP noted that the right to liberty and security of person 'requires that "any measure depriving a person of his liberty must be in accordance with the domestic law . . . where the deprivation of liberty takes place"'. 152 It then discounted this rationale on the basis that there 'is no rule that a person indicted by the Tribunal can be arrested only pursuant to the national law of the place where the person is located'. 153 Of course it is true that the ICTY is not limited in its functioning by the national laws of the states in which it acts -otherwise any non-co-operative state could legislate at any time to prevent its functioning in that state. But if the OTP is to look to jurisprudence setting out the right to liberty and security at the national level and distil the requirement that the deprivation of liberty must comport with the procedural guarantees where this deprivation takes place, surely the apposite question for the Trial Chamber is whether Todorovi´c had been afforded his procedural rights under the international law governing the functioning of the ICTY, not whether he had been afforded his procedural rights under the law of the FRY.
Second, while conceding that 'Tribunal indictees do enjoy the right to liberty and security of person under international law', 154 the OTP argued that in Todorovi´c's case this right had been met. However, the OTP appeared to favour an extremely limited interpretation of the right. It noted that 'such rights are not violated where persons validly indicted for serious violations of international humanitarian law are apprehended in order that they be taken into custody to face trial on such charges'. detention and had not specifically authorized an arrest in the country to which the accused had fled -as 'immaterial', 157 and appeared content to overlook whether excessive force had been used. In short, the OTP appeared to be asserting that neither the particulars of the arrest warrant nor the nature of the apprehension were relevant to the issue of the right to liberty and security -so long as the indictment was valid. Consideration of the right to liberty and security of person by international bodies both at the European level 158 and the wider international level 159 suggests that the OTP's approach may be overly deferential to the Tribunal.
A final element of the OTP's argument against a violation of Todorovi´c's right to liberty and security considers the violation of the FRY's sovereignty. For the purposes of the motions, the OTP conceded that the FRY's sovereignty had been violated; This argument would appear to be an amalgam of the question of whether an individual may claim a remedy for a breach of his or her state's sovereignty 162 with the quite separate question of whether an individual may claim a remedy for a breach of his or her right to liberty and security of person.
No unlawful breach of the FRY's state sovereignty
A final argument -that, in the light of the Tribunal's unique position, measures taken by it in the FRY relating to Todorovi´c's arrest did not violate that state's sovereigntywas only made latterly by the OTP and was not considered by the Trial Chamber. 163 Somewhat confusingly, this argument appears to contradict earlier arguments of the OTP which were premised on the assertion that, for the purposes of the motions, it was willing to concede that the sovereignty of the FRY had been violated. 164 Moreover, the argument would appear to be at variance with the OTP's earlier assertion that the activity surrounding Todorovi´c's arrest could in no way be attributed to the Tribunal. 165 At the heart of this argument is the assertion that because the ICTY is a creation of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII, the ICTY is subject to a specific exception to the Charter's prohibition on interference in domestic affairs. 166 The OTP argued that the powers of the ICTY 'in the legitimate performance of its functions . . . prevail over traditional concerns of state sovereignty'. 167 As such, 'measures taken by this Tribunal under Chapter VII, which would otherwise constitute an illegal breach of the sovereignty of a state, are lawful.' 168 If it were otherwise, the OTP argued, then much of the functioning of the Tribunal would result in such breaches of sovereignty. In sum, several of the arguments of the OTP were ill-conceived. The argument that Todorovi´c was not entitled to have access to information relating to his arrest seems particularly flawed. However, the OTP's decision to proceed with such an approach would appear to have been motivated by the hope that the Trial Chamber would have accepted a weak argument in order to prevent alienating SFOR and its powerful participating states. A less independent Trial Chamber might have done so. By taking an approach that there could be no compromise on the issue of disclosure, the SFOR added to its own difficulties by forcing the Trial Chamber's hand. While the OTP's approach to the issue of the appropriateness of the requested remedy in the face of illegal capture was problematic in many of its aspects, the issue of how the Trial Chamber should deal with an accused brought before the Tribunal in a similar way remains to be decided. And this is one of the key issues in the Nikoli´c case, currently before the ICTY.
NIKOLI´C : TODOROVI´C REVISITED
Dragan Nikoli´c's allegations of illegal capture have a familiar ring. Nikoli´c was indicted on 4 November 1994 for crimes against Muslim and other non-Serb detainees at the Susica camp. 171 Orders for his arrest were issued on the same day, but he remained at large until 21 April 2000. 172 He alleges that sometime shortly before 21 April he was abducted in Serbia by men who falsely claimed to be police officers, forced into the boot of a car, driven to the border with Bosnia, smuggled across the Drina river by boat, and then handed over to US SFOR soldiers. 173 His captors were 170. If there were to be a finding that the capture was in conformity with the mandate of the ICTY notwithstanding violations of Todorovi´c's human rights under international norms, then difficult constitutional questions on possible limitations upon the Security Council's powers would need to be examined. 171. He was charged with eight counts of crimes against humanity stemming from his alleged involvement in ethnic cleansing and his alleged position as commander of the Susica detention camp. The camp was said to be overcrowded and the detainees were not provided with adequate food or other facilities. Moreover, it is alleged that the detainees were beaten on a regular basis -sometimes to death. Rape and sexual assault are also alleged. subsequently convicted by a Serbian court for offences relating to the capture 174 and, according to some reports, found to have been acting in return for payment of £31,000. 175 Nikoli´c was transferred to the ICTY on 22 April 2000. At his initial appearance on 28 April, he pleaded not guilty on all counts.
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On 17 May 2002, Nikoli´c brought a motion before the ICTY on the basis of the nature of his capture, requesting that the indictment against him be dismissed and that he be immediately returned to the FRY. 177 He described his capture as 'pernicious' and argued that 'a judicial body set up with . . . the objectives of preserving human rights can have no proper option but to make it plain that jurisdiction will not be entertained in such circumstances'. 178 Nikoli´c alleged that his apprehension was in violation of the national sovereignty of the FRY and contrary to international human rights norms. Moreover, he argued that these breaches of international and national law resulted in an abuse of process.
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Given that the Trial Chamber's decision that Todorovi´c was entitled to disclosure from SFOR and its participating states was the ace in the hole that resulted in his negotiating a favourable plea agreement with the OTP, it might have been expected that Nikoli´c would follow a similar path and seek potentially embarrassing disclosure from SFOR and its participating states. Surprisingly, he did not. Instead, his counsel requested that the Trial Chamber determine the jurisdictional consequences that would flow from a successful challenge to the legality of the arrest as a preliminary matter. 180 Of course the OTP, which along with SFOR had been agitating for this approach in the Todorovi´c case, was only too pleased to follow this course. 181 Under this approach, SFOR and its contributing states are safely out of reach of any embarrassing requests for disclosure from the Tribunal -at least until the complicated issues related to remedy are considered. Presumably, if the Trial Chamber finds that the requested remedy is inappropriate, Nikoli´c will request the Tribunal -which by then may very well be losing patience with the matter -for an order requiring disclosure from SFOR; 182 if the remedy is found to be appropriate, the OTP still has the option of making a deal with Nikoli´c.
When this motion comes before the Trial Chamber, many of the arguments will echo those made in the Todorovi´c case. It is already clear, based on the briefs filed in support of the motion, that the OTP will again rely on municipal law analogies involving irregularities in the means by which accused are brought before national courts. Once again there are assertions by the defence that his right to liberty and security of person was violated. And once again the OTP argues that even assuming that violations of international law could be shown to have occurred in the manner of the accused's arrest, the remedies sought were inappropriate in the circumstances.
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Given that, as of the date of writing, the motion has not been decided, the Nikoli´c case, as yet, does little to clarify the law on illegal capture. However, absent a lastminute settlement, it would appear that the Trial Chamber, and perhaps ultimately the Appeals Chamber, is likely to address and clarify the issues relating to illegal capture and the appropriate remedies associated therewith. Other indictees who have been brought before the Tribunal by SFOR 184 will, no doubt, be watching these developments very closely indeed.
APPLICATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
With the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 185 and the establishment of the ICC, 186 the difficulties of enforcement of international criminal law will come into sharper relief. How will this nascent court with its at evidence-gathering but rather, as a necessary preliminary to such measures. This consideration, it is submitted, is particularly pertinent where the evidence-gathering exercise in question may impinge upon the vital national security interests of third States and/or multinational forces in the field. See Prosecution Response to Defence Motion of 17 May 2001, supra note 172, at para. 11. 182. Both Nikoli´c's counsel and the OTP stipulated that the Trial Chamber's determination of the jurisdictional consequences of a successful challenge to the arrest be on a without prejudice basis with regard to any future position it may decide to adopt on the question of disclosure, thereby allowing Nikoli´c to seek disclosure from SFOR and NATO at a later date if necessary. 183. Relying on the article by Lamb, supra note 90, the OTP argued that for the release of the accused to be an appropriate remedy there would need to be, at a minimum, either: (1) 'unambiguous, conscious violations of international legality which can be attributed to the Office of the Prosecutor'; and/or (2) 'violations . . . of such egregiousness or outrageousness that, irrespective of any lack of involvement on the part of the prosecution, the Trial Chamber could not, in good conscience, continue to exercise jurisdiction over the accused'. The OTP argues that it was not involved and that the alleged conduct was not sufficiently egregious. seat in the Netherlands be able to mete out justice when those it will be seeking to prosecute are scattered about the globe? Will it ever be appropriate for force to be used in a member state which has failed to uphold its obligations in international law to surrender an accused? The guidance provided by the Todorovi´c case and the other jurisprudence of the ICTY is limited. This is so for at least two reasons. First, as discussed, the trinity of cases that has emerged relating to illegal capture offers little precedential value: with the Dokmanovi´c case, the Tribunal found the capture not to be illegal; with Todorovi´c, the issues of illegal capture and SFOR's possible involvement were forever buried in the 28 November 2000 Plea Agreement; and with Nikoli´c, the issues remain under consideration by the Tribunal. Second, it must be recalled that the jurisdiction of the ICTY arose through Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, an enviable genesis not shared by the ICC. As such, under the ICC Statute only states parties have an obligation to co-operate, and even then it is an obligation with certain limitations.
187
With the ICTY, on the other hand, states are obliged to surrender an accused by virtue of a binding Security Council resolution. 188 Despite its incomplete nature, the jurisprudence of the ICTY on the issue of illegal capture does illustrate one important point: that the principle of male captus bene detentus is unlikely to be accepted by international criminal adjudicators. It is telling that neither the OTP nor SFOR were confident enough in the principle to rely on it other than as, effectively, an alternative argument. This may well be a realization by the OTP and SFOR that, in the face of the near-universal condemnation of the approach in international law as illustrated in the aftermath of the Alvarez-Machain case, 189 this would be a losing battle. 190 Scharf's conclusion, that 'an international criminal tribunal would have to dismiss a case where the defendant has been abducted in violation of international law ', 191 appears to be the correct one.
Moreover, the issues which emerged from Todorovi´c may prove helpful to the ICC if at some stage its Prosecutor, despairing at the fact that an accused has not been surrendered despite a state party's obligation to do so, looks to creative methods of capture. It would not be unimaginable for a scenario to develop whereby the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, determined that international peace and security was threatened, and established a peacekeeping or enforcement operation with a mandate to arrest suspects. 192 Similarly, nothing would prevent the Security Council from calling on a state to surrender an accused to the ICC or face sanctions. 193 If, in either situation, an accused was arrested contrary to the wishes of his or her state of residence, the lessons from the ICTY jurisprudence -inconclusive though they are at this stage -may afford some assistance.
Perhaps the main lesson for the ICC would be that any body undertaking the task of arresting an individual indicted by it should exercise extreme caution, or the result may well be that the ICC will be obliged to release the individual. Depending on what jurisprudence may emerge from the Nikoli´c case, it may well be that the OTP's approach of distancing itself from the arrest process is misguided. It may be wiser for the ICC to reject this approach in favour of one whereby it becomes involved from the outset in any proposed action to arrest (in the form of the Prosecutor, the Registry, or perhaps even the Presidency), in order to ensure its legality and assess the effect it would have on the eventual trial of the accused.
POSTSCRIPT
On 2 October 2002, after the above was finalized, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY issued a Decision dismissing the motion brought by Nikoli´c on the basis of the nature of his capture. 194 The Trial Chamber divided its reasoning into two parts. First, it considered whether the conduct of the alleged kidnappers could be attributed to SFOR or the OTP. Because the counsel for Nikoli´c had agreed for the purposes of the motion 'that the apprehension and transportation into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was undertaken by unknown individuals having no connection with SFOR and/or the Tribunal', 195 the Trial Chamber found little difficulty in determining that the conduct of Nikoli´c's captors could not be attributed to SFOR or the Tribunal.
The Trial Chamber then considered whether 'the illegal arrest in itself constitutes a direct obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal ', 196 and considered the two approaches taken by national case law regarding illegal interstate capture. 197 and his human rights and rights to due process were greatly facilitated by Nikoli´c agreeing for the purposes of the motion that neither SFOR nor the OTP had any involvement in his capture. But for this concession, the matter may well have been decided differently.
Despite some initial procedural difficulties, 201 an appeal by Nikoli´c against this Decision may very well take place. Moreover, there would appear to be nothing to prevent his counsel from following Todorovi´c's path and requesting disclosure of evidence from SFOR and perhaps, ultimately, arriving at a Plea Agreement similar in nature to that reached by Todorovi´c.
